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EDITOR'S BRIEF 
How is the Constitution meant to be understood? This fundamental question 
remains overlooked in American legal education, unless we are to accept the 
explanation that the Constitution "is whatever the Court says it is." Constitu-
tiona I law is taught by the case method, which allows for the fundamental consti-
tutional principles to be disregarded. Instead, students are presented with crafty 
legal arguments and novel bases for constitutional interpretations. Constitutional 
law should at least allow students to question whether there exists a Constitu-
tion that is fundamental law and not a fuzzy charter for social activism and judi-
cial governance. 
Re-evaluating constitutional law in the law school curriculum has particular 
contemporary significance in that public dissatisfaction has greatly increased 
with controversial Supreme Court decisions on abortion, busing and school 
prayer. These relatively recent holdings ignore hundreds of years of precedent 
and appear to be based upon personal policy preferences on the High Court rather 
than the basic principles of republican liberty embodied in the Constitution. Yet 
students are presented with such cases as the gospel, not as creative jurispru-
dence where various approaches have been exploited to reach specific ends. The 
framers' intent, the legislative history, and, most of all, the actual language are 
often ignored. 
Studying the documentary wording and the constitutional history is certainly 
not an illogical legal approach. In contracts law, for example, we are taught that 
proper enforcement should be based upon the language of the instrument and, if 
necessary, an examination of the intent of the parties. While the Constitution 
may be based upon jurisprudential principles that are not always clear, this is not 
a reason to shun constitutional principles, discard the intent of the framers and 
blindly accept the Court's bizarre reworking of the document. Constitutional law 
should focus upon distinctions between the wording and intent of a particular 
clause and novel Supreme Court interpretations. Instead, legal curricula employ 
the case method, where students are presented with judicial assaults on their 
intelligence-where the Court finds that limits imposed on the federal govern-
ment can be transformed into federal power over state governments, and the 
Court discovers "penumbras" and "emanations" floating around specifically 
enumerated rights regardless of what the framers' intended. In "The Birth of the 
'Living' Constitution," Professor Eugene W. Hickok, Jf. questions the basis of a 
"living" Constitution. This article helps contribute to the contemporary debate 
by recognizing that the study of constitutional law is inseparable from an under-
standing of fundamental constitutional principles. 
One particular area where the Supreme Court has exhibited confused and 
inconsistent precedents has been where state practices have been challenged 
under the Establishment Clause of the first amendment. In "The Creche, the 
Cross and the Establishment Clause," Tim Shelly discusses how, in Lynch v. 
Donnelly, the Supreme Court squeezed the case into a "surrounding circumstan-
ces" analysis in order to uphold a forty-year old municiple practice of displaying a 
creche during the Christmas season. That government has a duty to promote 
religion in general and encourage morality among the people has been a funda-
mental principle of American political tradition since the birth of the Nation. Not 
until the 1960's, when the federal judiciary first implemented a policy of rigid 
separation of church and state, did this tradition meet with federal opposition. 
Lynch may signal an about-face in judicial policy. It remains to be seen how far 
the Court will allow the judicially-imposed barriers between church and state to 
be broken down. Regardless of the correctness of the Lynch result, this case illus-
trates the ease with which the Court creates a particular analysis to reach a 
desired result. 
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TRIBUTE TO WILLIAM F. SWINDLER 
Warren E. Burger 
ChieIJustice of the United States 
Professor William F. Swindler was a colleague and personal friend for a long 
time. We worked together on historical matters and on the founding of the Supreme 
Court Historical Society, where he later was Director of Publications. We will all 
miss him greatly. 
Bill Swindler was a product of the Midwest. Born in Missouri, he graduated from 
Washington University in St. Louis and received a master's degree from the Uni-
versity of Missouri. He began his career in journalism and several years later came 
to the law when he obtained a law degree from the University of Nebraska. His 
second career was as a law professor and for twenty-five years he was associated 
with the Marshall-Wythe Law School at William & Mary. Upon his retirement in 
1979 he was named John Marshall Professor of Law Emeritus. 
An analyst and historian of first rank, Bill Swindler contributed to the American 
Bar Association, the American Law Institute, the American Judicature Society, and 
to a wide readership his many ideas. He was prolific in the creative sense, and a 
careful scholar. I always found him to be an optimist, looking ever on the bright 
side of things. He was warm, generous, and caring. He was hard-working, but he 
experienced such joy in what he was doing that he presented no image of a work 
addict. In the last 15 years of his life, Bill Swindler wrote more than a dozen books. 
I remember especially his 1978 publication The Constitution and Chief Justice Mar-
shall because he asked me to prepare an introduction for it. Typically, at the time of 
his sudden death, Bill was working on three additional books. One was a treatise on 
constitutional law, another was on the Continental Congress, and the third was on 
the Supreme Court during the era of Chief Justice Earl Warren. 
During the coming half-decade our Nation will celebrate the Bicentennial of the 
Constitution. It is our loss that he will not take part in it for he had much to 
contribute and would have enriched our knowledge and understanding of this great 
event. Only four days before his death, Bill wrote to me, "I hope in the coming 
five-year period climaxing in the bicentennial of the Judiciary Act in 1989, we can 
indeed collaborate frequently on 'matters historical." , In all my tentative plans, I 
envisioned a role for this fine scholar-historian. 
A teacher of law is trustee of great traditions and Bill Swindler was a trustee 
who kept that trust. His teaching, scholarship, and professional activities earned 
the respect of the legal profession and of generations of students. He will be missed. 
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THE BIRTH OF THE "LIVING" CONSTITUTION 
Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. * 
It has become more than commonplace to refer to the Constitution of the Uni-
ted States as a "living" document. Indeed, it has become doctrine. High school 
students are taught that the Constitution "adapts" to changes in time and cir-
cumstance much the wayan organism adjusts to changes in its environment. 
Students enrolled in undergraduate courses in American Government are told 
that the Constitution remains relevant primarily because of the efforts of politi-
cians and Supreme Court Justices to "interpret" the document and "bend" it to 
fit modern circumstance. It is a "living" constitution, so it is argued, not only 
because it "specifies highly technical governmental 'rules of the game,'" but 
because it also "encompasses implicit norms of custom and usage, which have 
evolved over the decades in response to important political needs."1 As Walter 
Berns has described it, "a living Constitution is first of all a protean constitution, 
one whose meaning is not fixed."2 
Those who advocate this understanding of the Constitution point to John Mar-
shall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland as intellectual support for their position. 
In MuCulloch, Marshall points out that the Constitution is " ... intended to 
endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of 
human affairs."3 But Marshall's argument is that the Congress is the means 
through which this government is to remain "relevant." Marshall did not say that 
the Constitution should be adapted to the various crises of human affairs; he said 
that the powers of Congress are adaptable to meet those crises."4 Marshall's 
understanding of the character of the Constitution remains consistent with his 
statement in Marbury v. Madison: "The Constitution is either a superior para-
mount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary 
legislative acts, and, like other acts, alterable when the legislature shall please to 
alter it." For Marshall, the Constitution and the principles it embraces, "are 
deemed fundamental and permanent."5 
Proponents of a "living" constitution will have to look elsewhere for a spokes-
man. John Marshall cannot legitimately be considered an advocate for their posi· 
tion. Of course, this is not to say that advocates can't be found. One might turn to 
Mr. Justice Douglas, for example, who, in his concern to find a way to protect 
individual privacy, looked to the "emanations" flowing from the "penumbras" of 
the Constitution to produce a Constitutional "right to privacy." (Griswold v. Con-
necticut) Then there is Mr. Justice Black dissenting in Adamson v. California, 
after finding that the historical purpose of the fourteenth amendment has "never 
received full consideration" by the Court and that, contrary to what the majority 
of his colleagues on the bench at the time might think, "the framers and backers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed its purpose to be to overturn the con-
stitutional rule" established in Barron v. Baltimore. Indeed, advocates of a "liv-
ing" constitution can find support in the decisions of a number of Justices. 
The doctrine of a "living" constitution is a by-product of judicial decision-
* Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. is Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College and Co-Director, Center 
for the Study of the Constitution, Carlisle, PA. 
I Ira Carmen, Power and Balance, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1978), p. 27. 
2 Walter Berns, "Do We Have A Living Constitution?" in National Forum: Toward the Bicentennial of 
the Constitution, a publication of the Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi, Fall 1984, p. 29. 
3 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.316 (1819). 
4 Berns, op. cit., p. 30. 
5 Ibid. 
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making. Ever since Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes first announced that the 
"Constitution is what the judges say it is" the doctrine of a "living" constitution 
has attracted its score of supporters.6 
The framers of the document never spoke of a "living" constitution. They did 
speak of a permanent one. For the men who gathered in Philadelphia, words were 
not simply empty vessels into which one might pour meaning. For the framers, 
words had meaning and they chose their words carefully to express exactly what 
the Constitution was intended to provide. They recognized a need to allow for 
inevitable change in society. But they also saw a need to temper temporary pO;JU' 
larity with adherence to permanent principles. They understood the distinction 
between popular impulse or inclination and the long-term public interest. They 
recognized the need for a written constitution that would provide "the fundamen-
tal and paramount law of the nation," (Marbury v. Madison). The very fact that it 
is a written constitution is important. 
It was because certain principles were considered to be of such an important 
and permanent nature that a revolution was fought and a new government 
constructed-a new government under a written constitution so that government 
by men might never stray from those principles. As Walter Berns so aptly puts it, 
the concern of the framers "was not to keep the Constitution in tune with the 
times, but, rather, to keep the times, to the extent possible, in tune with the 
Constitution."7 
The contemporary doctrine of a "living" constitution is the product of a mis-
guided understanding of the way the framers understood the document and of the 
early attempts by the Court to interpret it. In addition, it is a by-product of judi-
cial decision-making by activists who, from time to time, have provided the 
majority on the Court with the authority the Constitution does not provide them. 
The nourishment for the "living" Constitution, in other words, has been provided 
by judicial activism. The primary vehicle employed by the activists has been the 
fourteenth amendment. Indeed, the birth of "our living Constitution" can be 
traced to the transformation of the Bill of Rights that has transpired through 
incorporation. 
I 
Perhaps the most telling evidence of the degree to which the idea of a "living" 
constitution has come to dominate the study and practice of law in the United 
States can be found in the way the Bill of Rights has been transformed. What 
was originally intended to be a check upon the powers of the federal government 
has been transformed by means of the fourteenth amendment into a vehicle for 
the aggrandizement and enhancement of federal governing authority. It is surely 
one of the supreme ironies of our constitutional history that an entire portion of 
the Constitution dedicated to the preservation of individual liberties through the 
maintenance of a limited government has produced instead an expansive federal 
government in the name of protecting individual rights. In retrospect, the fears of 
the Anti-Federalists-those who opposed the new Constitution and the threat of 
consolidated government-seem all too prescient. 
The idea of a bill of rights, although certainly part and parcel of the revolution-
ary fervor that so colored the colonies in the 1770's, actually can be traced to the 
Magna Carta of 1215. Until the Puritan Revolt in Great Britain, that document, 
along with English common law, provided the primary protection of individual 
rights. As Robert Rutland has pointed out, "the American Revolution had its 
seeds in the Puritan Revolt of English forebears, with the avowed goal of giving 
6 As quoted in Henry Abraham. The Judicial Process, (New York: Oxford Press, 1980), p. 324. 
7 Berns,op. cit., p. 30. 
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citizens the freedoms won a century earlier in the mother country."8 
The Bill of Rights to the federal Constitution has its roots in the several bills of 
rights that were to be found in the constitutions of the states in the 1780's, and 
can be traced directly to the Virginia Declaration of Rights, written by George 
Mason and adopted in convention in June of 1776. That document says, in part, 
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a 
state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest 
their posterity, namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with 
the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing 
and obtaining happiness and safety.9 
The similarities between the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the Declaration 
of Independence adopted a few weeks later is telling. Both documents served to 
underscore the degree to which colonists understood the nature of the relation-
ship between the individual and his government. In the words of Edmund Ran-
dolph of Virginia, 
In the formation of the bill of rights two objects were contem-
plated: one, that the legislature should not in their acts violate 
any of those canons; the other, that in all revolutions of time, of 
human opinion, and of government, a perpetual standard should 
be erected, around which the people might rally, and by a notor-
ious record be forever admonished to be watchful, firm and 
virtuous. 1O 
The federal Bill of Rights emerged as the product of political compromise 
struck during the ratification debates. James Madison, a principal architect of the 
new Constitution and, in the end, the primary architect of the Bill of Rights, had 
argued vehemently against attaching a bill of rights to the federal Constitution. 
According to Madison, "bills of rights" would be both "unnecessary" and "dan-
gerous" in the new Constitution. "They would contain various exceptions to 
powers which are not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colorable 
pretext to claim more than were granted."l1 It made very little sense indeed, rea-
soned Madison, to declare that the federal government shall not do certain things 
when the government already has no power to do them. For Madison, the issue 
was quite clear: "Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press 
shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be 
imposed?"12 Moreover, Madison argued, 
the truth is ... that the Constitution is itself, in every rational 
sense, and to every useful purpose, a BILL OF RIGHTS. The 
several bills of rights in Great Britain form its Constitution, and 
conversely the constitution of each state is its bill of rights. 13 
8 Robert Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1955), p. 3. 
9 See Robert Rutland, op. cit., p. 35-40. 
\0 From "Randolph's Essay," Virginia Magazine of History, 44 (1936), p. 47, as quoted in Rutland, op. 
cit., p. 39. 
II See Federalist No. 84. 
12 See Federalist No. 84. 
13 Ibid. 
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According to Madison, attaching a bill of rights to the new Constitution seemed 
an unwarranted act that in all probability would make the process of ratification 
even more arduous than already anticipated. But to those in the states who 
looked upon Mr. Madison's constitution with some concern, a bill of rights 
seemed a necessary protection against the threat imposed by the construction of a 
strong and "energetic" central government. As one ardent Anti-Federalist put it, 
"For universal experience demonstrates the necessity of the most express decla-
rations and restrictions to protect the liberties of mankind, from the silent power-
ful and ever active conspiracy of those who govern. "14 In response to the Federal-
ist argument that Americans were already so enlightened as to make it almost 
inconceivable that individual freedoms, such as freedom of religion, would ever be 
denied, "An Old Whig" replied, 
They are idiots who trust their future to the whim of the pres-
ent hour ... What is there in the new proposed Constitution to 
prevent his [a conscientious objector] being dragged like a Prus-
sian soldier to the camp and there compelled to bear arms?15 
As Raoul Berger has pointed out, then, "it was not fear of State mismanage-
ment but distrust of the remote federal newcomer that fueled the demand for a 
federal Bill of Rights which would supply the same protection against the federal 
government that State constitutions already provided against the States."16 Per-
haps more importantly, it was a fear that worked to the political advantage of the 
Anti-Federalists. Here was an issue that "transcended sectional interests" and 
struck to the very root of those principles that had produced the Revolution and 
the Articles of Confederation, and which, allegedly, underwrote the proposed new 
Constitution as well. In the end, the supporters of the federal Constitution recog-
nized that political necessity required that a bill of rights be attached to the doc-
ument. James Madison himself, while campaigning for the new Congress, 
advanced the argument that 
the Constitution ought to be revised, and that the first Congress 
meeting under it, ought to prepare and recommend to the States 
for ratification, the most satisfactory provisions for all essential 
rights, particularly the rights of Conscience in the fullest lati-
tude, the freedom of the press, trials by jury, security against 
general warrants &C. 17 
Initially, the Federalists could take some solace in the fact that the Bill of 
Rights was added by the new Congress upon the ratification of the states, rather 
than through another constitutional convention that might have led to other, 
perhaps more far reaching reforms. But perhaps more importantly, the political 
leaders of the time, men such as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, eventu-
ally came to recognize that a federal bill of rights had a value in its own right, in 
addition to the purpose it had served in the struggle for ratification of the Consti-
tution. They developed an appreciation for "the salutary effects of a federal Bill of 
Rights as a benchmark in the American experience in self-government."18 
14 Rutland, OPt cit., p. 135. 
15 Rutland,op. cit., p. 137. 
16 Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 135. 
17 Rutland, op cit., p. 196. 
18 Rutland, op cit., p. 218. 
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The Bill of Rights emerged from the struggle for ratification then as the pro-
duct of political compromise_ But it was a principled compromise_ As Robert 
Rutland has argued, the Bill of Rights "clearly demonstrated that the American 
Revolution had a broad ideological base and that it was not only a military, politi-
cal and social upheaval-but also a legal rebellion," that "served notice for all the 
world that national independence, without personal liberty, was an empty 
prize_"19 
II 
For the first generation of Americans to live under the Constitution of 1789, the 
purpose of the Bill of Rights remained clear: to place demar. -ably far-reaching 
restraints upon the central government.20 The Supreme Court, 've its blessings 
to this doctrine with Barron v. Baltimore in 1833. Here, in one "i the last deci-
sions written by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court made it clear that the 
federal government could not interpose itself between the individual and the 
state. Marshall reasoned that the "Constitution was ordained and established by 
the people of the United States for themselves, and not for the government of the 
individual states." Because of this, the Bill of Rights must be understood as plac-
ing restraints upon "the power of the general government, not as applicable to the 
states_" For Marshall the issue was not a difficult one to resolve: 
Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be lim-
itations on the powers of the State governments they would 
have imitated the framers of the original Constitution, and 
expressed that intention . 
. . . These amendments contain no expression indicating an 
intention to apply them to the State governments. This Court 
cannot so apply them.21 
The first major challenges to the Court's ruling in Barron came after the ratifi-
cation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution in 1868. The amendment 
itself did not overturn Barron. But the stream of Supreme Court decisions that 
has flowed from this, "the most controversial and certainly the most litigated of 
all amendments adopted since the birth of the Republic," has served to transform 
the Bill of Rights, as Justices, in their attempt to fashion "just" solutions to polit-
ical and constitutional problems, breathed "life" into the Constitution.22 
Whether the framers of the fourteenth amendment looked upon it as a vehicle 
for applying the Bill of Rights to the states does not really concern us here. 
Regardless of the framers' intent, the Court indeed has found that the amend-
ment calls for the "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights. It does not seem to matter, 
in other words, that even a cursory glance at the historical record surrounding 
the introduction of the amendment and the debates leading up to its ratification 
might lead one to question how Mr. Justice Black could argue, as he does in his 
dissent in Adamson v. California, that the framers of the amendment intended 
"to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the States."23 
The evidence supporting "incorporation" is not as compelling as Justice Black 
would have one believe. For example, while Henry Abraham argues, on the one 
19 Rutland, op. cit., p. 218. 
20 Henry Abraham, Freedom and the Court, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 26. 
21 See Barron v. The Mayor and the City Council 0/ Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
22 Abraham, Freedom and the Court, op. cit., p. 28. 
23 See Adamson v. Co/tfornia, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
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hand, that "there seems relatively little doubt that the A mendment's principal 
framers and managers, ... if not every member of the majority in the two houses 
of Congress, did indeed believe the Bill of Rights to be made generally applicable 
to the several states via one or more segments of section 1 [of the amendment]," 
Charles Fairman, in an exhaustive study appearing in the Stanford Law Review, 
finds the opposite to be true.24 
According to Fairman,1ustice Black is wrong. 
In his contention that Section 1 was intended and understood to 
impose Amendment I to VIII upon the States, the record of his· 
tory is overwhelmingly against him.25 
And in a companion article to Mr. Fairman's, Stanley Morrison finds that "in the 
absence of any adequate support for the incorporation theory, the effort of the 
dissenting judges in Adamson v. California to read the Bi1l of Rights into the 
Fourteenth Amendment amounts simply to an effort to put into the Constitution 
what the framers failed to put there."26 
Putting the controversy aside (much as Justice Black did!), however, it may be 
the better part of wisdom to recognize that there is precious little profit to be 
found in dwelling upon the integrity of a theory that has acquired the status of 
"constitutional truth" over the years, no matter how questionable that integrity 
may be. After all, whether or not the framers of the fourteenth amendment 
intended the "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights, the Bill of Rights has been 
incorporated. And the doctrine of "incorporation" has changed the rules of the 
constitutional game. But what should trouble the advocates of constitutionalism 
is not so much the wisdom of the idea of "incorporation" but the kind of thinking 
that produces such controversial and questionable constitutional law. It is not 
enough that Justice Black was seeking to establish a rule of law for civil rights 
and liberties that would be "both drastic and simple and that would guarantee 
certainty for all future litigation."27 For as Stanley Morrison points out, the prob-
lem with this is that "no matter how desirable the results might be, it is of the 
essence of our system that the judges stay within the bounds of their constitu-
tional power."28 Lino Graglia puts it well: 
The use of improper methods in reaching decisions has its own 
results that detract from any good to be achieved, and the use of 
proper methods lends some assurance that the good results 
desired will in fact be achieved and, if achieved, will come to be 
seen as good.29 
The decisions by the Court that gradually have led to the "incorporation" of 
almost the entire Bill of Rights through the fourteenth amendment represent, as 
a class, decisions aimed at bringing the Constitution into line with the egalitarian 
24 Abraham, Freedom and the Court, op. cit., p. 39. 
25 Charles Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original 
Understanding," 2 Stanford lAw Review, (December 1949), p. 139. 
26 Stanley Morrison, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial 
Interpretation," 2 Stanford lAw Review, (December 1949), p. 173. 
27 Abraham, Freedom and the Gaurt, op. cit., p. 37. 
28 Morrison, op. cit., p. 173. 
29 Lino Graglia, Disaster by Decree, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), p. 260. 
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and democratic tendencies that color contemporary society. They reflect the 
desire of members of the Court to adjust the Constitution to meet particular 
demands of the times. That members of the Court might act on such a desire is to 
be expected to a certain extent. Under a republican constitution, public opinion 
matters, and the Court, as one of the three political institutions, has always, after 
a fashion, reflected prevailing public sentiment. But the institution devised by the 
framers for insuring that public opinion influences government is the legislature, 
not the Court. Moreover, the ability of the legislature to respond to public opinion 
is limited by the constraints found in the Constitution. And the only way to get 
around those constraints is to alter the Constitution, through amendment. 
The mechanism exists for bringing the Constitution into line with contempor· 
ary society. But it is a cumbersome and time-consuming mechanism to employ, 
and for good reason. The hallmark of good government, so the framers believed, is 
its ability to respond to the "permanent and aggregate interests of the commun-
ity" rather than the "transient opinions" and "inclinations" that might from 
time to time infect the people and inflame the passions. The Constitution, in 
other words, was not designed to become a flexible barometer of prevailing public 
sentiment. The document instead forces us to put public sentiment into perspec-
tive. It speaks to permanent principles and outlines a government that is designed 
to act upon those principles when responding to the public will. 
Attempts on the part of the Court to bring the Constitution into line with con-
temporary society represent something of an "end run" around the Constitution; 
accomplishing constitutional change without having to adhere to the document's 
own procedures for providing for change. Playing fast and loose with a written 
constitution is being defended as interpreting a "living" constitution. The trans-
formation of the Bill of Rights illustrates the extent to which the Court has been 
able to "breathe" into the Constitution whatever "life" it wishes. It challenges all 
thoughtful students of the Constitution to reaffirm the integrity of what Thomas 
Jefferson once referred to as "our peculiar security"-a written constitution. 
12 
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THE CRECHE, THE CROSS 
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Tim Shelly* 
I. THE LYNCH DECISION 
The display of religious symbols, particularly Latin crosses and creches, by 
governmental bodies or on public property, has been extensively contested in 
lower courts to determine whether such displays violate the Establishment 
Clause l contained in the first amendment of the United States Constitution. But 
the Supreme Court did not address the matter until 1984 when it decided Lynch 
v. Donnelly.2 In Lynch, the Court held that the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, 
did not violate the Establishment Clause when it erected a lifesize creche in a 
privately-owned park as a part of its annual Christmas display. Numerous other 
decorations commonly associated with the Christmas season surrounded the 
creche. The entire display was temporary and the cost of the creche was min-
imal.3 Under these circumstances, the Court decided that no establishment of 
religion existed. 
At the outset of its analysis, the Court acknowledged that a complete separa-
tion of government and religion is neither possible nor desirable.4 The Constitu-
tion does not require, but actually forbids such a separation as violative of the 
Free Exercise Clause.s In support of this proposition, the Court listed numerous 
examples where states have recognized "the role of religion in American life" 
without violating the Constitution.6 
The Court noted that a literal reading of the Establishment Clause is not 
required. Both Religion Clauses are to be construed, instead, in a manner of effec-
tuate their objectives. The constitutionality of challenged governmental conduct 
should be judged by "whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious 
faith, or tends to do SO."7 To make this determination the Court acknowledged 
that it has relied on the three-prong analysis formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 8 
In the Lynch opinion, however, Chief Justice Burger noted that the Lemon analy-
sis is not always applicable in Religion Clause cases. Burger pointed to Larsen v. 
Valente9 and Marsh v. Chambers lo as two examples where the Court employed a 
* Tim Shelly is a third·year law student at Marshall·Wythe School of Law. 
1 Sixteen recorded cases have involved Establishment Clause challenges to government displays of 
religious symbols. Two cases have involved Establishment Clause issues other than the religious 
symbol question. One case involved both a Free Exercise and an Establishment Clause challenge. 
2 Lynch v. Donnelly, U.S. ,104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). 
3 ld. at 1358. 
, ld. at 1359 citing Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 
(1973). "It has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation." 
5 ld. at 1359. 
6 ld. at 1359. The list included official recognition of religious holidays, references to God in the 
national slogan and the Pledge of Allegiance, the national museums' displays of religious art and the 
presidential designation of a National Day of Prayer. 
7 ld. at 1361 (emphasis added). 
8 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612·613 (1971). The Court articulated a three-part test: (1) Does the 
display possess no secular purpose (2) Is its primary effect to inhibit or advance religion or (3) Does it 
cause excessive governmental entaglement with religion. 
9 Larsen v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
10 Marsh v. Chambers, U.S. ,103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983). 
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different analysis. 11 
After making this assertion, and immediately prior to undertaking the Lemon 
analysis, the Court suggested that "the surrounding circumstances" must be 
considered when the state allegedly violates the Establishment Clause. 12 Examin-
ing "the surrounding circumstances" made it possible for the Court to apply the 
Lemon test. When viewed as a portion of a large secular Christmas display, the 
creche passed the three-pronged Lemon test. 
The Court held first that the creche depicted the origins of a national holiday 
and thus had some "secular purpose." The fact that the creche also may have had 
a religious purpose did not make its erection and maintenance unconstitutional 
under the first prong of the Lemon test. 13 
Just as easily, the Court dismissed the argument that including the creche in 
the Christmas exhibit had the "primary effect of advancing religion." The Chief 
Justice asserted that a simple display of a creche along with numerous other 
Christmas decorations would not advance religion any more than other state 
activities which are constitutionally permitted. To support this proposition, he 
pointed to tax exemptions for church properties, federal grants to church-
sponsored colleges and other monetary benefits religious organizations receive 
from the state.14 Any benefit a religion might derive from Pawtucket's display 
was too "indirect, remote, and incidental" to merit concern. IS 
Finally, the Court held that there was no "excessive governmental entaglement 
with religion." Pawtucket officials did not contact any church authorities about 
the purchase, design or erection of the creche. Additionally, the costs of the 
creche were viewed as de minimis. The Court also pointed out that throughout 
the forty-year history of the creche display, the only showing of political divi-
siveness was this lawsuit. Commencement of such a suit, by itself, was insuffi-
cient to trigger the Lemon prohibition of excessive government eritaglement with 
religion. 16 
Possibly, the most significant aspect of Lynch is the Court's assertion that the 
Lemon analysis need not be employed in all Establishment Clause conflicts.17 The 
ease of application to the Lynch factual setting possibly saved the Lemon test. 
Questions remain, however, as to the applicability of the test to factual situations 
that differ from the Lynch case. IS The purpose of this paper is to formulate a 
II 104 S. Ct. at 1362. 
\2 Id. at 1362. The Court stated that "the focus of [its] inquiry must be made on the creche in the 
context of the Christmas season." Implicitly the Court held that a display of a religious symbol, if 
part of a larger exhibit celebrating a holiday, cannot be detached from that context and its constitu· 
tionality analyzed as if the symbol were being displayed alone. 
\3 /d. at 1363. 
14 See id. at 1363. The Chief Justice also listed government·supplied textbooks for church·sponsored 
schools, funding for pupil transportation to such schools, Sunday Closing Laws, release time pro· 
grams for religious training and legislative prayers as constitutionally valid conduct. 
\5 Id. at 1364. 
\6 Id. at 1365. 
\7 Id. at 1362. Professor Jesse Choper argues that the Supreme Court laid the foundation for abondoning 
the Lemon test in Lynch. See]. Choper, Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: An Overview, speech 
given at the Southern Conference of Attorneys General (Sept. 13, 1984). At least one federal district 
court agrees with Dr. Choper. See May v. OJpperman, 582 F. Supp. 1458, 1462 (O.N.]. 1984), where the 
court held that after Lynch the Supreme Court may "shift course and pursue a less than vigorous 
application of the Lemon [sic.] test." See also 104 S.Ct. at 1370·71 (Brennan,]" dissenting). 
\8 104 S.Ct. at 1370. Justice Brennan expressed his disappointment with the majority's inability to draft 
an opinion that would guide decision making in other cases of governmental displays of religious 
symbols. 
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practical means of analysis for determining when the exhibit of a religious sym-
bol violates the Establishment Clause_ 
II. THE ACTUAL ANALYSIS EMPLOYED 
IN DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF A STATE'S RELIGIOUS SYMBOL DISPLAY 
Allowing a state practice of displaying a religious symbol even though it may be 
either religious in origin or nature permits the birth of the analysis elaborated 
below_ 19 If in all cases the judiciary focused solely on the religiosity of the dis-
played symbol or the religious motivation behind the government's actions, the 
conduct would inevitably be violative of the Establishment Clause_2o Such a strict 
application of the Establishment Clause, producing a frigid restraint upon reli-
gious activity by the state, would, however, cause an infringement of Free Exer-
cise rights.21 Consequently, the Supreme Court recognized that a complete sepa-
ration of government and religion is neither practical nor desirable.22 
If a complete separation of church and state is impractical, and indeed uncon-
stitutional, the judiciary is forced to determine the form and extent of commin-
gling of the two clauses permitted by the Constitution. In making these determi-
nations, courts have ardently applied the three-part analysis formulated in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman. 23 In most cases that have involved the display of a religious symbol 
by the state, the courts have explicitly applied the Lemon analysis (or one of its 
predecessors if the decision was rendered prior to Lemon}.24 In these cases, how-
ever, the courts have not employed a three-prong test like that used by the 
Supreme Court in Lemon. Rather, the analysis has collapsed into a single ques-
tion: Does the government's display of religious symbols either promote or inhibit 
religion? 
A. The Ineffectiveness of the First and Third Prongs 
of the Lemon Analysis 
The first step of the Lemon analysis invalidates state displays only when 
purely religious purposes have motivated the action.25 As the Supreme Court 
noted in Lynch, governmental conduct is constitutionally valid when it is moti-
vated by a single secular consideration, even if the conduct substantially benefits 
19 Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 947·48 (O.c. Cir. 1970). The display of a religious symbol by the state 
includes the government's purchase, erection and maintenance of a display and the use of pulic 
property by private individuals or organizations for a display of a religious symbol. 
20 104 S. Ct. at 1362. 
21 Id. at 1359. 
22 Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 312·13 (1952); 104 S.Ct. at 1358; Also see Walz v. Commissioner, 397 
U.S. 664, 669 ( ); Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. 
O'Brien, 272 F.Supp. 712, 719 (0.0.c. 1967); Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 276 Or. 
1007,558 P.2d 338, 342 (1976), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 876 (1977); Baer v. Kolmorgen, 14 Misc. 2d 1015, 
1021·22 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1958). 
23 403 U.S. at 612·613. 
24 104 S.Ct. at 1362; See American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. Rabun County Chamber of Com· 
merce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983); Gil/illan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3rd Cir. 
1980); Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. City and County of Denver, 508 F. 
Supp. 823 O. Colo. 1981}; 558 P.2d 338 (1976); 424 F.2d 944 (O.c. Cir. 1970); Paul v. Dade County, 202 
So. 2d 833 (Fla. Oist. Ct. App. 1967) (the latter two cases employed the two-step Schempp analysis). 
25 402 U.S. at 612. 
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religion.26 Usually this standard can be easily met, especially when the symbol is 
displayed in conjunction with a holiday or ceremony having religious origins. In 
these cases, the government normally maintains that the display depicts the his-
torical background of the holiday or ceremony,27 a purpose the Supreme Court 
has recognized as secular.28 Only in cases involving blatant religious motivation 
and the lack of any rational secular justification have such displays been prohi-
bited by the first step of the Lemon analysis. 
In Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 29 the city's erection of a large platform, on 
which stood a thirty-six foot tall wooden cross, was held unconstitutional because 
it failed the first strand of the Lemon analysis.3D The city constructed the plat-
form at a cost of $204,000 for the Pope's use during his visit to the United States. 
From this platform his Holiness celebrated a mass attended by nearly one million 
persons and viewed by many more on television. The platform was constructed 
for the sole purpose of providing a place of worship for the Pope;31 it was not 
erected as a display celebrating a secular holiday or event.32 Thus, because the 
state-supported display lacked any rational secular purpose, it was prohibited 
under the first prong of the Lemon analysis. 
Similar to Gilfillan is American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. Rabun 
County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. 33 In Rabun County a local chamber of com-
merce, with initial approval from various state agencies and employees, paid for 
the construction of a permanent Latin cross in Black Rock Mountain State Park. 
The cross was eighty-five feet tall, and, because of its size and location, it was 
visible from miles away and could be seen from the major highways traversing 
the county. Prior to its construction, the chamber of commerce issued press 
releases containing religious and inspirational statements about the cross. The 
construction deadline was Easter. Shortly after announcing the construction of 
the project, the chamber of commerce received several complaints charging that 
such a display would violate the Establishment Clause. In response, the chamber 
drafted a resolution designating the cross as a memorial to deceased citizens in 
Rabun County. This resolution, however, was never officially adopted and the 
cross was dedicated at Easter Sunrise Services.34 
Holding that the cross violated the Establishment Clause, the eleventh circuit 
required that the cross be dismantled. The inability of the Rabun County cross to 
pass the first prong of the Lemon analysis forced this conclusion. Using an analy-
sis similar to that used in Stone v. Graham,35 the court reversed the lower court 
26 104 S.C!. at 1362. 
27 See id. at 1363: Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Salt Lake City. 475 F.2d 
29,33 (10th Cir. 1973). 
28 See 104 S.C!. at 1363; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (per curium). 
29 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980). 
30 The federal court of appeals actually held that the city could not bear the cost of this construction. 
The court, however, suggested that the decision was limited because the plaintiff had only argued 
that such expenditures were constitutionally impermissible and did not address the constitutionality 
of the symbol's display on public property. 
31 637 F.2d at 929. 
32 The court also held that the city's conduct violated the Establishment Clause under the other two 
strands of the Lemon test; the primary effect of the conduct was the advancement of religion, and the 
city had become excessively entangled with religion. 637 F.2d at 929. 
33 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983). 
34 !d. at 1101·1102. 
35 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curium). 
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and held the display was not constitutional because its true religious purpose had 
been masked at trial with a secular purpose. The historical basis for the cross 
unquestionably indicated that it "was erected out of religious stirrings and for a 
religious purpose."36 Only in cases such as Gilfillan and Rabun County, where no 
rational secular purpose is asserted or discernible prior to the constitutional 
attacks, does the first prong of the Lemon analysis become effective. In most 
cases, the ease of showing a secular purpose effectively writes out the first prong 
of the analysis.37 
Similarly, the third step of the Lemon test is effectively read out of the analysis 
except in the most obvious cases of Establishment Clause violations. Generally, 
the third prong is a factor only when government officials are actively involved in 
designing, erecting or overseeing the display;38 where state and church officials 
have participated jointly in designing, erecting or overseeing the display;39 or 
where the state has expended inordinately large sums of money on the display.40 
Additionally, when the only divisiveness caused by the religious symbol display is 
the suit in question,41 the devisiveness, by itself, is insufficient to violate the 
entaglement strand of the Lemon analysis.42 
In most instances, the display of a religious symbol is conducted in such a 
manner as to avoid the application of the first and third strands of the Lemon 
analysis. Presumably, this results from the public policy that government should 
be prohibited from exclusively promoting sectarian goals and that state officials 
should not and cannot work closely with church authorities. Consequently, most 
challenged displays have fallen into two categories. Either they have been pri-
vately donated and shown on public property or they have been owned and oper-
ated by a government whose financial and managerial involvement has been de 
minimus. Additionally, such displays usually have been erected and maintained 
in conjunction with a secular holiday or ceremony so that the state could assert a 
rational secular purpose for celebrating that event. Therefore, the vast majority 
of cases involving religious symbol displays are decided by the second step of the 
Lemon analysis: Does the person viewing the display perceive it as an endorse-
36 698 F.2d at 1ll0. 
37 See 558 P.2d 346. The ease of meeting this standard is demonstrated in Eugene Sand, where the 
Oregon Supreme Court held that when a secular organization sponsors a display of a religious sym-
bol for a secular purpose, the first prong of the Lemon analysis is satisfied. 
38 [d. at 347. (The entanglement prong of the analysis is violated when the government has participated 
"in an active manner" in planning and overseeing the display. 
39 See 104 S.Ct. at 1364. To determine if the "government entanglement" was sufficient to violate the 
Religion Clauses, the Court's analysis focused on the extent of contact between religious and 
government officials with regard to the conduct. See also 631 F.2d at 931, where the excessive 
government entanglement was found because various city officials were involved in joint planning of 
the platform and cross with the Archdiocese; 434 F.2d at 950, where the opinion suggests that the 
government should divest itself of its supervisory role over the display of a creche as part of the 
annual Christmas pageant; Fox v. City of Los Angeles; 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 
(1978), where the California Supreme Court expressed particular concern with government officials' 
consultations with various sectarian leaders about the maintenance and illumination of a large Latin 
cross displayed on the side of a courthouse. 
40 See 104 S.Ct. at 1364, where the Court found the government's tangible (financial) involvement "de 
minimus, " a factor which, individually, does not create an excessive government entanglement with 
religion; 637 F.2d 924, where the government expenditure of $204,000 for a platform and a cross was 
held to be "excessive government entanglement" with religion; 558 P.2d at 347, where the entangle-
ment prong was not violated because the government was only bearing a de minimus expense in 
maintaining the religious symbol. 
41 See 698 F.2d at 1098; 475 F.2d at 29; 508 F. Supp. at 823. 
42 104 S.Ct. at 1365. See McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), where local candidates who 
made a religious display a platform issue were adjudged to have violated the entanglement strand. 
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ment or rejection of religion by the state?43 
In applying the second strand of the Lemon analysis, the lower courts are in 
agreement that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the state from depict-
ing objects possessing spiritual content.44 Rather the Establishment Clause pro-
hibits governmental promotion of any spiritual content of the display_ As the 
Supreme Court held in Lynch, a literal interpretation of the Establishment Clause 
is not employed; instead, courts should scrutinize all questioned conduct to 
determine whether it actually establishes or tends to establish a religion.45 Essen-
tially "[t]he question is not whether there is any religious effect at all, but rather 
whether that effect, if present, is substantial."46 To determine if the display of a 
religious symbol substantially affects the viewers, all the circumstances surround-
ing the display must be considered.47 The size, permanence and setting of a dis-
play are all relevant considerations in determining the question of constitutional-
ity. A study of these factors should be undertaken to decide whether they offset 
any viewer perception that the display is a symbolic endorsement or rejection of 
religion by the state. Controversies involving religious displays can be more read-
ily resolved by employing a "surrounding circumstances" analysis than by an 
entire Lemon analysis. 
B. The Collapsed Lemon Analysis 
of Religious Symbol 
Display Cases48 
As noted above, the Establishment Clause does not mandate a complete separa-
tion of government and religion.49 The history of the United States is replete with 
state acknowledgements of the role religion plays in American society.50 The 
Supreme Court has recognized in various opinions that such a complete separation 
is not only impossible, but also undesirable.51 "[T]here is room for play in the joints 
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercises without 
sponsorship and without interference."52 This general proposition leads to the ques-
tion: What form of state conduct sufficiently advances or inhibits religion to cause a 
first amendment violation? 
43 To violate the second strand of Lemon, the display must have an effect on the individual viewer that 
causes a perception of the inhibition or advancement of religion. 
44 See 424 F.2d at 948; 508 F. Supp. at 827. 
45 104 S.Ct. at 1361. 
46 424 F.2d at 949. 
47 See 104 S.Ct. at 1362·63; Chase, Litigating a Nativity Scene Case, 24 St. Louis V.L.J. 239 (1980). If the 
"surrounding circumstances" concerning the state of a religious symbol were not considered in 
determining the constitutionality of a display, the second strand of the analysis would become use-
less, for the only effect of the display (and likely its only purpose) would be to advance religion. Thus, 
the surrounding circumstances analysis became crucial in finding that the creche did not violate the 
Establishment Clause. 
48 In this analysis, I have presumed that the first and third strands of the Lemon test have been met. 
Only blatant violations stumble on these two prongs of the analysis. Thus, close cases will be decided 
on the second strand. See 637 F.2d 924, where the city constructed an open air cathedral from which 
the Pope could preach; 698 F.2d 1098, where no secular purpose was found when an eighty· five foot 
tall cross was erected by a municipality. 
49 104 S.Ct. at 1358·59. The court explained that an "exercise of callous indifference" by the state 
toward any religion would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the first amendment. 
50 See id. at 1358. The Court gave a lengthly list of such governmental acknowledgements. 
51 See id. at 1358. 
52 397 V.S. at 669. 
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Governmental displays of religious symbols, as that phrase is used in this 
paper, may be grouped into three categories: first, temporary displays as part of 
larger secular displays celebrating temporal events; second, temporary displays, 
standing alone, but in conjunction with secularized celebrations; and third, per-
manent displays of religious symbols. 
1. Temporary Displays of Religious Symbols as Part of a Larger Secu-
lar Display 
Temporary displays of religious symbols as part of a larger secular celebration 
commemorating a holiday or event that possesses secular aspects include the 
Lynch creche and a variety of other symbols displayed during the Christmas sea-
son. Before Lynch, the state and lower federal courts found it difficult to decide 
religious symbol display cases on a rational basis and in a consistent manner. 
Since Lynch, this category of cases has become easier to decide and should be 
found constitutional. 
Read broadly, the Lynch decision indicates that such displays do not violate the 
Establishment Clause because a new factor, "the surrounding circumstances," 
has been incorporated into the legal analysis enabling the Court to find a Lynch-
type display constitutional.53 The "surrounding circumstances" approach is sim-
ilar to that used by the Court in Stone v. Graham54 and Abington School District v. 
Schempp. 55 This determination crystalized the proposition that the lower federal 
courts had formulated more than ten years earlier. In Allen v. Morton,56 the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the display of a 
creche on public property as part of the annual Christmas Pageant of Peace, 
which also included many lighted Christmas trees, live reindeer and a Yule log, 
could not be judged independently from the other displays of the Pageant.57 Eight 
years later, in deciding Citizens Concerned for Separation of Chur:ch and State v. 
City and County of Denver, 58 a court made a similar determination when it held 
that the constitutionality of a creche displayed on the steps of the county court-
house during the Christmas holidays must be judged as only a part of the entire 
one-block long display which contained thousands of Christmas lights, trees and 
many other figures commonly associated with Christmas.59 
Consideration of at least the immediate circumstances surrounding the display 
requires courts to analyze exhibits in the same manner as would a citizen stroll-
ing by the creche. The average person viewing the temporary creche along with 
the many other displays during the Christmas season would rationally perceive 
the entire scene as a celebration by the state of a national holiday that has both 
secular and religious aspects. No reasonable citizen could believe that such 
government conduct sanctions the adoption or rejection of certain religious 
beliefs. Thus, if the viewer perceives no message of adoption or rejection, then no 
advancement or inhibition of religion exists and, consequently, the Establishment 
Clause is not violated. 
The substantial time lag between the creation of an exhibit and the filing of 
52 397 U.S. at 669. 
53 [d. at 1362. 
54 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). 
55 Abington School District v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
56 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
57 [d. at 72. 
58 508 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1981) appeal dismissed 628 F.2d 1289 (10th Cir. 1981). 
59 [d. at 828. 
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any Establishment Clause challenge supports the theory that the average person 
views these displays in the context of "the surrounding circumstances" and does 
not conclude that the displays are a state endorsement of any specific religious 
tenet.60 Probably the most telling example is that involving Mr. Jonathon Chase, a 
constitutional law professor at the University of Colorado Law School and the 
primary initiator of Citizens Concerned. 6! Professor Chase viewed Denver's annual 
Christmas display for over eight years before he become aware in 1978 that the 
display contained a creche (when he read about the display and the creche in a 
local newspaper). Not until this time did a man possessing exceptional knowledge 
of the first amendment become aware that the city and county officials might be 
advancing religion and thus violating the Establishment Clause. Mter learning 
about the creche, Professor Chase submitted his name to the local branch of the 
American Civil Liberties Union and offered to represent anyone desiring to file 
suit. Two years later, an atheist organization contacted Chase about filing an 
injunction prohibiting the creche.62 
The historical background of Citizens Concerned, like that of Lynch, Allen and 
McCreary, indicates that the average citizen-viewer of a temporary creche display 
which is a part of a larger Christmas celebration does not perceive the creche as a 
state activity that espouses or spurns particular religious tenets.63 Without this 
perception, no actual advancement or inhibition of religion occurs. Without this 
advancement or inhibition, the second strand of the Lemon analysis and, conse-
quently, the Establishment Clause have not been violated. 
2. Independent Temporary Displays of Religious Symbols 
The second category of religious symbol displays is the temporary exhibit of a 
symbol, by itself, in connection with a secular holiday. Using ari analysis similar 
to that used for symbols as a part of a larger secular celebration, the various 
court decisions imply that a reasonable viewer would not understand that an 
interim display exhibited in conjunction with a holiday having both religious and 
temporal overtones is a state endorsement of religion. The viewer, instead, would 
see the display as part of the celebration of a secular holiday. 
Following this reasoning the district court in Protestants and Other Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State v. O'Brien64 directed that a temporary 
display of a religiously significant symbol during the Christmas season "cannot 
60 In Lynch, the city of Pawtucket displayed a creche scene as part of its annual Christmas celebration 
for nearly forty years before complaints based on the Establishment Clause were lodged against the 
creche's display. Almost twenty years passed in McCreary v. Stone before complaints about a similar 
display were lodged against local government officials in Scarsdale, N.Y. Fifteen years passed in 
Allen v. Hickel, and at least nine years elapsed in Citizens Concerned before suits were instigated. 
61 508 F.Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1981). 
62 See Chase, 24 St. Louis U.L.]. 239 (1980), for a more comprehensive explanation of the factual back· 
ground in the Citizens Concerned case. 
63 See 413 U.S. at 792·93. The Court held that historical acceptance cannot "provide a rational basis for 
ignoring the command of the Establishment Clause that a state pursue a course of 'neutrality' 
toward religion." Here, historical acceptance of a creche display is not offered to validate that display. 
Historical acceptance is, instead, used to show that individuals, who at least understand the first 
amendment and the Establishment Clause, have failed to perceive the state forcing religion upon 
them or else they would have complained to some official institution. As noted in the text, without 
such perception by viewers, religious beliefs or practices cannot be advanced or inhibited. 
64 272 F.Supp. 712, 721 (D.D.C. 1967). 
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be deemed in any sense even remotely connected with an establishment of reli-
gion. "65 Protestants was an injunctive relief action against the United States Post 
Office attempting to enjoin it from issuing a commemorative Christmas stamp 
bearing a portrait of the Madonna.66 The district court held that the Establish-
ment Clause only prohibited the state from proselytizing or conducting propa-
ganda or publicity in favor of any religion.67 
As with the temporary displays of religious symbols as part of a larger secular 
exhibit, independent temporary displays of religious symbols were being set up 
for years without constitutional challenge. This history indicates that the general 
populace does not perceive such displays as Establishment Clause violations. In 
both Paul v. Dade County68 and Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 69 local officials lighted a 
large Latin cross on the outside of the central government building during the 
Christmas season for twelve and thirty years respectively before receiving com-
plaints about the display. This fact pattern indicates that the ordinary viewer did 
not look upon the government conduct as endorsing or discouraging religion. 
Therefore, the challenged display passed the second and critical element of the 
Lemon analysis in that it would not be advancing or inhibiting religion when 
judged in the context of the surrounding circumstances. Thus the display would 
not violate the Establishment ClauseJo 
The major problem with temporary displays of religious symbols, independent 
of any secular exhibit, arises when the symbol is displayed for holidays or cerem-
onies that do not possess minimal temporal significance. Such displays have been 
held unconstitutional because their "primary effect" is the advancement of reli-
gionJI Under these circumstances a viewer cannot perceive the display as part of 
a celebration of a secular holiday. The government will be perceived, instead, as 
endorsing particular religious activities. This perception will have either a posi-
tive or negative effect on viewers, who will tend to become either more receptive 
to the religious practices and beliefs epitomized in the display or more hostile to 
those beliefs because of the connection between the display and the local govern-
ment. Therefore, almost by definition, an advancement or inhibition of religion 
exists under the second strand of the Lemon analysis, and, hence, the Establish-
ment Clause is violated. 
Most illustrative of this proposition is a case noted above, Fox. v. City of Los 
Angeles. 72 For thirty years, city officials annually lighted windows in city hall 
65 /d. at 713. 
66 [d. at 719. 
67 [d. at 719. 
68 202 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). 
69 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978). 
70 But See note 63, supra. 
71 See 637 F.2d at 931. The use of public funds for the temporary erection of a large wooden cross, 
throne and platform for the Pope's address had the primary effect of advancing religion, and had 
little, if any, secular purpose, and caused the excessive entanglement of government and religion. See 
also 587 P.2d at 665. The annual lighting of a Latin cross on the side of city hall during Christmas, 
Protestant Easter and Eastern Orthodox Easter had the primary effect of preferring and ultimately 
advancing religion. 
72 587 P.2d 663 (1978). Although decided on California constitutional law grounds, the Religion Clause 
of the California State Constitution, Cal.Const. art. I, 4, is identical to the Establishment Clause ·of 
the federal Constitution. Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 616, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244, 257, 90 
A.L.R.3d 728 (1976). But see Note, Fox v. City of Los Angeles: The State, the Cross, and Constitutional 
Religious Symbolism, 11 Sw.U.L.R. 713 (1979), interpreting that the California Establishment Clause 
analysis differs from the analysis used under the federal Establishment Clause. 
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forming a giant Latin cross on the nights of December 24 and 25. City officials 
never received any complaints about the cross. Then, upon the request of local 
religious leaders, the city began to light the cross on Easter and Eastern 
Orthodox Easter evenings. Los Angeleans immediately showered the city 
government with applause and reproaches, the plaintiff filed suit, and the display 
was ultimately held unconstitutional. These facts indicate that the public did not 
perceive the cross as a state endorsement of religion when the windows were 
lighted exclusively during the Christmas holiday. The cross was one of many 
other displays designed to bring a message of good will and peace in celebration of 
a semi-secularized holiday. Viewed in this manner, the lighted crosses did not 
advance or inhibit religion. The problem arose only after officials lighted the 
cross during the Easter holidays, and the public began to view the city as endors-
ing religion.13 Thereby, under the second strand of Lemon, the state had advanced 
religion, and the display was held unconstitutional. 
This analysis explains why the temporary cross illuminated on the Dade 
County courthouse is constitutional, while the temporary crosses in Philadelphia 
and Los Angeles were in violatl.im of the Establishment Clause or the equivalent 
state constitutional provision. This analysis also accounts for the constitutional-
ity of temporary creches displcyed on public school property during the schools' 
Christmas holidays in Lawrence v. Buchmueller74 and Baer v. Kolmorgen. 75 These 
displays were exhibited in conjunction with a religious holiday, the celebration of 
which is heavily secularized. No reasonable viewer of the creches during this 
period could possibly perceive the displays as a governmental endorsement of 
religion. If the displays were shown at a different time of year, the average viewer 
would look upon such exhibits as a state endorsement of a particular religion or 
particular beliefs. In the eyes of onlookers, religion either would be advanced or 
inhibited, and the symbol would fail the second strand of the Lemon analysis, 
thus violating the Establishment Clause. Consequently, temporary displays of 
religious symbols exhibited by themselves and not in connection with a secular· 
ized holiday or ceremony, such as Christmas or a state funeral, are un-
constitu tionaJ.76 
3. Permanent Displays of Religious Symbols by the State 
The third and final type of religious symbols are those permanently displayed 
by the state. These displays are more likely to be found to advance or inhibit 
religion because their permanence causes them to be perceived as a governmental 
endorsement of religion. To offset this perception, which exists presumptively, 
the state must undertake adequate measures to counter the religious message 
conveyed by the display and inform the public of the secular purposes of the 
exhibit. If such measures effectively offset any possible religious message, the 
display will be constitutional. 
A cursory study of permanent state displays of religious symbols indicates that 
nearly all stand alone or as a part of a larger permanent display of 
13 587 P.2d at 665. (Communications to city council praising the display of the Christian symbol during 
Eastern Orthodox Easter stirred deep emotions in the speaker and his family). 
14 40 Misc. 2d. 300, 243 N.Y.S. 2d 87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). 
15 14 Misc. 2d 1015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958). 
16 Presumably, a temporary display ~xhibited in such a manner would be constitutional if could pass 
the analysIs employed In determInIng the valIdIty of a permanent state display of a religious symbol. 
ThIS analysIs would prove dIffIcult because of the lack of an apparent secular purpose in exhibiting 
the display at this time (such as honoring an individual or group of individuals for their secular 
contributions to society). 
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religious symbols. Crosses placed at gravesites in federal and state ceme-
taries are a prime example of permanent religious displays. The graves at 
Arlington National Cemetary are marked by small white crosses, all of 
which are erected and maintained by the federal government on public 
property. Similarly, memorials exist throughout the Nation which are 
dedicated to veterans and erected by the state or on public property. 
Often these memorials have crosses, God's all-seeing eye or the Star of 
David. Other displays whose constitutionality have been litigated include 
massive Latin crosses,77 a monolith inscribed with the Ten Command-
ments and various other religious symbols,78 and a lifesize statue of a nun 
outfitted in full habit.79 
Permanent displays of religious symbols are more likely to be held an 
endorsement of religion by the state. The lack of mitigating circumstan-
ces, such as secular holidays or non·religious celebrations that would 
otherwise offset or detract from the religious message conveyed through 
the symbol, create this constitutional problem. An individual seeing the 
Latin cross on August 20 cannot perceive its display as a celebration of a 
secularized holiday. The only reasonable conclusion that an onlooker 
could reach is that the state has erected the symbol because it endorses 
the cross and the concepts and beliefs it symbolizes. As noted above, this 
perception eventually leads to the advancement or inhibition of religion 
by the state. For these reasons a permanent display of a religious symbol 
by the government, without any countervailing measures, will be found 
unconsti tu tional. 80 
The mere fact that a symbol is permanently displayed, however, does 
not create a violation per se of the Establishment Clause. The display can 
still be constitutional if the state effectively neutralizes the religious 
overtones. Essentially, the state must inform the public, either expressly 
or implicitly, that the purpose of the display is secular and is not 
intended as a state endorsement of religion. To determine whether a 
government has used successful means in informing viewers that the 
display was erected and is maintained for secular purposes, the size and 
location of the symbol must be closely examined. 
If the symbol is large or centrally located, or both, more persons will be 
able to see the symbol, and the state will have to undertake more exten-
sive measures to inform those viewers about the secular purposes of the 
symbol. Significant problems have occurred where large crosses were the 
subject of litigation, as in American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. 
Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, 81 Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City 
of Eugene, 82 and Lowe v. City of Eugene. 83 In these cases the crosses were 
77 See 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983); 558 P.2d 338 (1976); Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P.2d 789 (Okla.), 
eert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972); Lowe v. City of Eugene, 254 Or. 518,459 P.2d 222 (Case I), 463 P.2d 
360 (Case II) (1969), eert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042, Teh 'g denied, 398 U.S. 944 (1970). 
iB 475 F.2d (10th Cir. 1973). 
i9 57 So. 2d 238 (La. Ct. App. 1952). 
BO See, 24 St.L.U.L.R. at 266, for evidence that a display's permanence is a factor which the courts deem 
significant. (For example the district court in Citizens Concerned repeatedly asked questions concern· 
ing the duration of the creche's display). 
BI 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983). 
B2 558 P.2d 338 (1976). 
B3 See 459 P.2d 360 (Case II) (1969). Eugene Sand and both Lowe cases involved the same Latin cross, 
although many of the circumstances in the Lowe cases had changed by the time Eugene Sand was 
litigated. 
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large and were located where both local inhabitants and passersby could see 
them. 
The cross in Rabun County was eighty-five feet tall, constructed of steel, set in 
concrete and contained thirty-one vapor lights which were turned on two to four 
hours nightly. The cross stood atop a small mountain located in Black Moun-
tain State Park and was visible from several miles away, where it could be 
viewed by a large number of persons. Under these circumstances, local govern-
ment officials would need to publicly establish the secular purpose of the cross, 
which was allegedly to attract both residents of Rabun County and highway tra-
velers to the park. 
Instead of communicating this secular purpose to the public, only religious 
messages were conveyed. The local chamber of commerce issued press releases . 
asserting the various religious purposes for the erection of the cross and set the 
date of dedication for Easter Sunday. Additionally, the chamber of commerce 
arranged for an Easter Sunrise Service at the base of the giant cross. The 
government could only meet the first strand of the Lemon analysis, which 
requires some secular purpose for the cross-attracting tourists to the park. If 
the chamber of commerce had also addressed the primary effect strand, presuma-
bly they couJd have pointed to two factors mitigating the religiosity of the symbol. 
First, a private, secular organization instigated and paid for the construction of 
the cross. Second, the cross stood in a state park which provided a wholly secular 
surrounding. The combination of these two factors could have neutralized any 
message of state endorsement. 
Even if the chamber of commerce had addressed the primary effect strand, 
Establishment Clause problems would remain. Any traveler using the county 
highways would see the large, permanently displayed cross standing on state 
property but would have no knowledge that a private secular organization erected 
the cross. The only reasonable perception he could formulate would be that the 
government had endorsed the cross and the ideals it represents. The temporal 
setting surrounding such a symbol, by itself, would be an insufficient mitigating 
factor to offset the religious message under the Lemon analysis.85 
If a general secular purpose were singularly sufficient to satisfy the Lemon 
test, government officials could permit the construction of a permanent shrine 
including a cross, a Madonna, crucifixes, various altars and other artifacts of 
public property in the central business district without violating the Establish· 
ment Clause (if the two other prongs of the Lemon test86 were passed).87 
84 698 F.2d at 1100·1101. 
85 Cf Lowe (Case II), 463 P.2d at 362. 
86 As noted earlier, this would not be as difficult as it initially appears. A secular purpose, for example, 
could be the attraction of patronage to the central business district, thus stimulating the local econ· 
omy. Additionally, most religious symbol cases indicate that simply permitting a symbol to stand on 
public property does not cause excessive government entanglement, as long as the state donated only 
de minimus financial support and did not work closely with local religious leaders in designing and 
supervising the display. 
87 But cf 496 P.2d 792 (Okla. 1972), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 980 (1972). The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
upheld the erection of fifty·foot tall cross on public property (the local fairgrounds) by an organization 
of churches. The only factor detracting from the cross's religious message was its secular surround· 
ings. The court emphasized that it was not deciding whether the cross violated the federal Estab· 
lishment Clause. Its decision rested, instead, on the Oklahoma constitutional provision prohibiting 
any monetary or proprietary support to be given by the State to any church or church leader. Okla. 
Const. art. II, 7. Under state court interpretation, the government conduct involved could not be 
labelled "support of a church or its leader." The court held that "the commercial atmosphere in 
which the cross ... stands and the commercial setting that obscures whatever suggestions may 
emanate from its silent form, stultify its symbolism and vitiate any use, benefit, or support ... of 
religion." 
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The Lowe cases and Eugene Sand exemplify what measures could be taken to 
counter any evidence of state endorsement of religion. The cross in these three 
cases, which is standing today, is fifty feet tall and perched atop a hillside in a 
public park. Donated by private parties, the cross is lighted by neon lamps and is 
easily seen from several miles away. Consequently, many residents of Eugene, 
Oregon, can view the cross from their homes. Travelers using the nearby tho· 
roughfares can also see the symbol glow from the hilltop. In deciding Lowe, which 
preceeded the Lemon decision, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the erection 
of the cross violated the Establishment Clause because the cross only had a reli-
gious purpose and its primary effect was the advancement of religion. 
After the Lowe decision, the private parties, rather than dismantling the cross, 
deeded title to the monument to a veterans' association, who, in turn, donated it 
to Eugene as a memorial to those who died in battle. The city held an elaborate 
dedication ceremony for its new monument, installed a commemoratory plaque at 
the base of the cross and made plans to inscribe "Bravely They Died, Honored 
They Rest" in large letters along the cross bar of the memorial. 
Ultimately, the constitutionality of the monument was relitigated. In Eugene 
Sand, however, the Orgon Supreme Court held that the monument was constitu-
tional. Noting that numerous circumstances had changed significantly since the 
Lowe decisions, the court held that a "display of a large cross in a public park as a 
veterans' war memorial under such circumstances does not violate the Constitu-
tion."88 Later in its opinion the court reasoned that a "religious symbol does not 
have the primary effect of inhibiting or advancing religion when it is displayed by 
a secular organization and during secular holidays, festivals or pageants."89 
The court rationalized that the changed circumstances would lead a viewer to 
perceive the cross as a war memorial honoring fallen soldiers, not as an endorse-
ment of religion. The highly publicized dedication ceremony and the plaque 
informed Eugene residents of the secular purpose of the cross and neutralized any 
potential state endorsement of religion.90 In addition, the large lettering on the 
cross served notice to those unaware of the dedication ceremony or the plaque 
that the cross was not installed for religious purposes and was not intended to be 
an endorsement of religion by the government.91 Thus, the changed circumstan-
ces neutralized any overtones of state endorsement of religion or a particular set 
of religious beliefs so that no actual advancement or inhibition of religion 
occurred, and the Establishment Clause was not violated. 
The final type of permanent symbol displays are the small ones that can only 
be seen from close range. This sub-type of permanent displays includes crosses, 
crucifixes and other religious artifacts marking gravesites in public cemetaries 
and lifesize statues of religious figures and leaders. Under an analysis similar to 
that employed above, state officials must inform the public of the secular pur-
poses of the exhibits, thereby eliminating any possible perception of state endor-
sement of religion. This standard is not as stringent as that applied to massive 
88 558 P.2d at 346. 
89 Id. at 364. 
90 Id. at 347. 
91 Stone v. Graham can be easily distinguished from Eugene Sand. First, the posting of the Ten Com· 
mandments in public school rooms lacked a true secular purpose. Additionally, only minimal efforts 
were taken to counteract the endorsement message conveyed by the posting of the Commandments. 
These efforts only included the "fine printing" of an alleged secular purpose at the bottom of the 
Commandments. Such measures could hardly be deemed adequate to convey to schoolchildren that 
the public school system was not encouraging them to adopt and practice these tenets. In Eugene 
Sand, a valid secular purpose existed: honoring those who gave their lives in defense of their country. 
The efforts made by local officials and organizations were very much more effective in conveying this 
secular purpose to the general populace and, thus, balanced any religious message. 
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symbol displays. The lesser standard is justified because fewer measures are 
necessary to offset the potential religious endorsement. A smaller symbol would 
be seen by fewer people and from a much closer distance than a huge symbol 
erected in the same location. Thus, a small plaque, dedication ceremony or a well-
known secular program may be sufficient to prevent a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause. 
Two cases have involved permanent displays of small religious symbols and 
both upheld the constitutionality of the monuments. State ex. reI. Singelmann v. 
Morrison involved a lifesize statue depicting a nun in full habit, St. Frances Xav-
ier, Mother Cabrini, and honoring her contributions to the poor and needy of New 
Orleans.92 The Louisiana Court of Appeals held that a statue which honors an 
individual's secular contributions cannot be violative of the Constitution simply 
because it portrays a member of a religious order.93 The Knights of Columbus 
affiliate, who had designed and purchased the statue, conducted a small dedica-
tion that was attended by some local government officials. A small plaque noting 
that private contributions had financed the statue was installed at its base. 
Under the Lemon analysis, the court found that a legitimate secular purpose 
existed-honoring the humanitarian contributions made by Mother Cabrini to 
the city of New Orleans. The court held the primary effect of an effigy of a 
habited nun could not be an advancement or inhibition of religion. Although the 
court offered no explanation why religion was not advanced, presumably the 
plaque and dedication ceremony were sufficient to inform possible onlookers of 
the statue's secular purposes. When the message of religious endorsement is neu-
tralized by these factors neither advancement nor inhibition of religion can occur. 
Therefore, the Lemon analysis was passed and the display was held con-
stitutional. 
In Anderson v. Salt Lake City, a secular fraternal organization, the Eagles, 
donated to Salt Lake City a granite monolith measuring five feet tall and 
inscribed with the Ten Commandments, a cross, the Star of David and other 
religious symbols.94 The city placed the monolith on the courthouse lawn. The 
Eagles donated the monolith as a part of a state-wide program designed to 
improve youth morality. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit upheld the constitutionality of the monolith and in its decision addressed 
only the issue of the monolith's primary effect. Holding that the state may depict 
objects with a spiritual content, the court reasoned that a "passive" monument95 
which possesses a secular purpose,96 erected in such a setting by a secular frater-
nal organization as part of its statewide youth improvement program, did not 
violate the Establishment Clause. Essentially, the court held that a monument 
constructed under these circumstances could not advance or inhibit religion 
because the monument did not convey a message of state endorsement or rejec-
tion of religion which the viewer could perceive. 
In conclusion, the small permanent display of a religious symbol, like the dis-
play of a large symbol by the state, is constitutional if sufficient means are taken 
by the state to counter any perception by viewers that the government is endors-
ing or rejecting any particular religious beliefs. 
92 57 So. 2d 238 (La. Ct. App. 1952). 
93 [d. at 240. 
94 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973). 
95 [d. at 33. The court found that the monument was a "passive display" because it did not include any 
"element of coercion." Even though the religious display was in "plain view," according to the court, 
"no one is required to read or recite them [the Ten Commandments]." 
96 [d. at 33. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
In deciding the Establishment Clause question concerning state displays of 
religious symbols, the various courts have constructed, unintentionally, a sliding 
scale standard. Assuming that a valid secular purpose exists and no excessive 
entanglement between religion and government occurs, the state may display a 
religious symbol as long as sufficient measures are taken to squelch the inference 
of state endorsement of religion transmitted by the display. Almost by definition, 
a temporary display of a religious symbol that is only a part of a larger secular 
exhibit is constitutional. Such displays are normally celebrations of holidays or 
ceremonies with significant secular overtones. In this situation, an individual see· 
ing the display would understand it to be a secular celebration and not a state 
endorsement of religion. 
A nearly identical analysis is employed for determining the constitutionality of 
a temporary symbol display standing alone. The question in this situation 
becomes whether the holiday or event being celebrated is sufficiently secular in 
nature so that an individual who views the symbol understands it to be a celebra· 
tion of a secular occasion and not a general endorsement of the religious tenets 
surrounding the symbol. 
With the final type of state display, permanent symbols, the courts will look to 
the circumstances attached to the symbols and attempt to determine if they effec-
tively neutralize the endorsement of religion and send a message of secular pur-
pose to the viewers. If the viewers perceive no state endorsement or rejection of 
religion, no advancement or inhibition of religion occurs, and the modified Lemon 
analysis is passed. Thus the Establishment Clause is not violated. 
Regardless of the type of display involved, future Establishment Clause cases 
will, most likely, employ a sliding scale analysis. 
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THE INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW 
The Institute of BilI of Rights Law at the MarshalI-Wythe School of Law is well 
on its way toward establishing itself as a national center for research on the Bill 
of Rights, particularly on first amendment speech and press issues. The endow-
ment generously provided by the Lee Memorial Trust Fund has enabled the law 
school to maintain a diverse full and part-time staff and to establish a framework 
of symposia and other meetings to encourage research on Bill of Rights-related 
issues and interaction between journalists and academic and practicing lawyers. 
The establishment of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law recognizes the substantial impact of Williamsburg and the College 
of William and Mary in the early history of the Bill of Rights. 
The Institute's primary objective is scholarly research on the Bill of Rights, 
particularly in the area of the first amendment. The major endeavor is modern 
first amendment law, with an emphasis on speech and press issues, together with 
the dissemination of knowledge of Bill of Rights law to lawyers, people involved 
in communications media, and the public. Substantial resources are also dedi-
cated to the study and teaching of legal history, particularly the Anglo-American 
history of personal liberties, professional responsibility and effective legal writ-
ing. The additional professorial staff and opportunities available to the students 
make the Institute a major contribution to the growth, development and diversity 
of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
The Institute function most noticeable outside the law school is its annual 
symposium on first amendment issues. The symposium is designed to stimulate 
and disseminate original research on the first amendment. It attracts a national 
audience of both practicing and academic lawyers and journalists. The first sym-
posium was co-sponsored by the William and Mary Law Review; jointly the law 
review and the Institute published the proceedings. The Institute separately dis-
tributed the proceedings to a large audience of those interested in journalism and 
the law. 
This year's symposium, on March 29 and 30, 1985, will be on "National Secur-
ity and the First Amendment" and will feature three speakers of national reputa-
tion: Burt Newborne, Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union and 
Professor of Law at New York University; Bruce Fein, Vice President of Gray and 
Company, Washington, D.C.; and Robert Kamenshine, Professor of Law at Van-
derbilt University and visiting Lee Distinguished Professor in the Institute of Bill 
of Rights Law. They will speak, respectively, on "The Use of National Borders to 
Interfere with Free Trade in Ideas," "Access to Classified Information: Constitu-
tional and Statutory Dimensions," and "Embargoes on Exports of Ideas and 
Information: First Amendment Issues." Additionally,john Shenefield of Milbank, 
Tweed, Hadley and McCloy will address the luncheon audience on the subject of 
"National Security and the Exercise of Civil Liberties." A distinguished panel of 
varied backgrounds and employment will comment on the papers; both the papers 
and commentaries will be published soon after the symposium. 
The Institute's first symposium, in March, 1984, was a resounding success. 
The topic was "Defamation and the First Amendment: New Perspectives." The 
Institute was fortunate in its first year to attract as principal speakers Professor 
David Anderson of the University of Texas Law School, Professor Marc Franklin 
of Stanford Law School, and Professor Frederic Schauer, then a visiting professor 
and now permanently at the University of Michigan Law School. Both Professor 
Schauer, while Cutler Professor of Law at Marshall-Wythe, and Professor Ander-
son were instrumental in the formation of the Institute and in setting its direc-
tion. The proceedings of the first symposium, published as a special issue of the 
William and Mary Law Review, have received extraordinarly favorable reactions. 
The Institute also sponsors and supports other substantial events related to its 
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mission. On November 7-8, 1984, the Institute invited Professor Lee Bollinger to 
speak on "Tolerance and the First Amendment" at the annual George Wythe 
Lecture; that paper, delivered in two sessions, will be published soon. The Insti-
tute is sponsoring a plenary session on the making of the Constitution at the 
annual meeting of the American Society for Eighteenth Century Studies, which 
will meet in Williamsburg in March, 1986. 
The Institute's interest in the relationship between law and media leads it also 
to co-sponsor events of particular interest to the media. In July, 1985, the Insti-
tute is co-sponsoring a conference of the American Society of Newspaper Editors 
here in Williamsburg. That conference will address libel, privacy and megaver-
diets, government restrictions on access to information, and anti-trust. In 
November, 1985, the Institute will co-sponsor a conference of the Southern News-
paper Publishers Association for the discussion of the development of first 
amendment press doctrine. 
The symposia and other co-sponsored events constitute a vital contribution to 
the legal and journalism professions and contribute to the educational potential of 
the Marshall-Wythe School of Law. These programs should grow in stature as 
the quality already established is maintained. 
Although it has a special mission and is totally funded from outside sources, 
the Institute is designed as an integral part of the law school. To maintain a 
careful congruence of goals with law school needs and purposes, Dean William 
Spong, Jr., is ex officio the Director of the Institute. Since Dean Spong is retiring 
this year, his successor will likewise assume that position. Dean Spong has been 
Director of the Institute since its inception in 1982. His long career of involve-
ment in state and national politics, including his service both as a senator in the 
Virginia legislature from 1956 to 1966 and as a United States Senator from 1966 
to 1973, eminently qualified him for this position. In teaching the professional 
responsibility course in the law school, Dean Spong has actively fulfilled that 
portion of the goals of the Institute. During his three years as Director, he has set 
the Institute on a course that combines a dedication to research with teaching 
and service to the school and the profession. 
The ordinary administrative tasks, preeminently the organization of the sym-
posia and various functions, are the province of James W. Zirkle as the Deputy 
Director of the Institute. Professor Zirkle received his J.D. from the University of 
Tennessee and LL.M. from Yale Law School in 1973. Prior to coming to Marshall-
Wythe as Deputy Director of the Institute and Associate Professor, he was an 
Associate Dean and Lecturer in Law at Yale. At Marshall-Wythe, in addition to 
his administrative duties, he teaches Constitutional Law. Professor Zirkle has a 
lively interest in national security problems, particularly in regard to intelligence 
agencies. He is currently researching the Freedom of Information Act and its 
functions. 
In fulfilling the primary mission of the Institute toward first amendment con-
cerns, the Lee Memorial Trust Fund enables the law school each year to bring in 
a Distinguished Lee Professor, normally with a light teaching load, to encourage 
first amendment research while providing additional opportunities for students. 
Currently Robert Kamenshine of Vanderbilt University is the Lee Professor; 
David Anderson of the University of Texas was the first Lee Professor. In 1985 R. 
Kent Greenawalt, Cardozo Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, will be the 
Lee Professor. He is the co-author of The Sectarian College and the Public Purse 
and the author of Legal Protection of Privacy and Discrimination and Reverse 
Discrimination. 
Robert C. Palmer is the Adler Fellow of the Institute and an Assistant Professor 
at Marshall-Wythe. He received his Ph.D. in History from the University of Iowa 
in 1977, and taught at the University of Michigan Law School for four years, first 
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as a junior fellow of the Michigan Society of Fellows and then as a Lecturer in 
Law. Professor Palmer has published extensively in English legal history and, 
under the auspices of the Institute, is researching also in American legal history. 
His first book, County Courts of Medieval England, received the American Histori-
cal Association's Herbert Baxter Adams Prize for 1984, as the best first book of an 
author in European history. His second book, The Whilton Dispute, 1264-1380: A 
Social-Legal Study of Dispute Settlement in Medieval England, was published in 
1984. His most recent work has been on the origins of property law in twelfth 
century England and on the incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the four-
teenth amendment in the United States. He is currently working on a book on the 
Bill of Rights. Professor Palmer teaches both American and English Legal History 
as well as a course on the Historical Backgrounds of the Bill of Rights. 
Professor Michael Hillinger fulfills the legal writing portion of the Institute's 
mission as the Director of Legal Writing at Marshall-Wythe and the Moot Court 
Advisor. He received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University in 
1967 and his J.D. from Marshall-Wythe in 1983. Before receiving his J.D., he 
taught History and Political Science at the Hampton Institute. Prior to joining 
Marshall-Wythe in 1984, he was a law clerk to the Honorable Walter E. Hoffman, 
Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia. Professor 
Hillinger teaches Appellate Advocacy and Legal Research and Writing. One of his 
moot court teams recently won the Marshall-Wythe Moot Court Invitational 
Tournament. His research interests are in the area of immigration law and com-
parative law, with a special interest in Eastern European legal systems. 
The late Laura Lee provided the endowment for the Institute in memory of her 
parents, Alfred Wilson Lee and Mary I. W. Lee. Her bequest created the Lee 
Memorial Trust Fund, stipulating that an Institute of Bill of Rights be estab-
lished to further the principles embodied in the first amendment's guarantee of 
free speech and a free press. The Lee Memorial Trust Fund provides the Institute 
with $250,000 annually for its first seven years, of which 1984-85 year is the 
third, with the corpus of the endowment to be conveyed in the final year. The 
Trust is currently managed by Arthur B. Hanson, of Hanson, O'Brien, Birney and 
Butler, Washington, D.C., the late Laura Lee's lawyer; Lloyd G. Schermer, cur-
rent President of Lee Enterprises, Inc., of Davenport, Iowa; and Richard 
Schermer of Hanson, O'Brien, Birney and Butler, Washington D.C. Richard 
Schermer assumed his position as trustee on the death of Philip D. Adler, a pre-
vious president of Lee Enterprises, Inc. 
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